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ABSTRACT

Although any attorney can represent clients with complex
property, tax, or administrative issues, only a certain class of attorneys
can assist with obtaining and challenging patents before the United
States Patent & Trademark Office (PTO). Only those who are members
of the PTO's patent bar can prosecute patents, and eligibility for the
patent bar is only available to people with substantial scientific or
engineering credentials. However much sense the eligibility rules make
for utility patents-those based on novel scientific or technical
inventions-they are completely irrational when applied to design
patents-those based on ornamental or aesthetic industrial design.
Nevertheless, the PTO applies the same eligibility requirements to both
utility and design patents. While chemical engineers are eligible to
prosecute both utility patents and design patents (in any field),
industrial designers cannot even prosecute design patents.
This Article applies contemporary research in the law and
economics of occupational licensing to demonstrate how the PTO's
application of eligibility rules to design patents harms the patent system
by increasing the costs of obtaining and challenging design patents.
Moreover, we argue that the PTO's rules produce a substantial
disparate impact on women's access to a lucrative part of the legal
profession. By limiting design patent prosecution jobs to those with
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science and engineering credentials, the majority of whom are men, the
PTO 's rules disadvantage women attorneys. We conclude by offering
two proposals for addressing the harms caused by the current system.
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INTRODUCTION

When people need help securing their legal rights, they typically
seek the aid of an attorney. Likewise, when inventors need help
securing their legal rights-patents-they also usually seek the advice
of attorneys.1 But while any licensed attorney can help someone buy
property or set up a corporation, only a certain class of attorneys is
entitled to help inventors secure patents. To assist with patent
"prosecution," an attorney must be a member of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office's (PTO) patent bar. Joining the patent bar
requires passing the patent bar exam-an additional exam that primarily
tests PTO rules and procedures. Importantly, the patent bar exam has its
own eligibility rules. The PTO generally prohibits people from even
sitting for the patent bar unless they have an undergraduate degree in
science or engineering or have taken numerous classes in these fields.
These strict eligibility rules dramatically restrict the number of
people who are able to prosecute patents. There are only 43,000
registered patent attorneys and agents in the U.S., although the number
of actively practicing members is likely closer to 25,000.2 Not
surprisingly, this restriction in the supply of eligible patent attorneys
increases the price of obtaining and challenging patents. In this respect,
PTO eligibility rules resemble other sorts of occupational licensing
restrictions, such as those requiring certain credentials to cut hair, sell
real estate, or practice dentistry.
Here, the ostensible reason for the restriction involves the
challenging technical nature of patents. 3 Utility patents cover
complicated scientific and technological discoveries that are,
necessarily, on the cutting edge of innovation. One can understand the
desire to restrict those who can draft patents on pharmaceuticals and
semiconductors to a subclass of people who are more technologically
sophisticated.
But however much sense the PTO's eligibility restrictions might
make for utility patents, they are completely irrational and downright
harmful when applied to design patents. Like utility patents, design
patent applications must be examined by the PTO, and claimants
typically seek assistance from attorneys and agents when drafting their
claims. But unlike utility patents, design patents only cover a product's
visual, ornamental design and not its underlying functionality. 4 Despite
I Inventors can also seek assistance from registered "patent agents" who are not licensed
attorneys. Colin Wright, PracticingLaw Without Legal Training: The ExpandedAuthorization of
Non-Lawyer Under the ALA, 15 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 129, 132 (2017).
2 Dennis Crouch, Estimate: Fewer than 26,000 Active US Patent Attorneys & Agents, PATENTLY0 (Jan. 13, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/01/the-uspto-records-identify-more-than41750-active-registered-practitioners-that-number-is-obviously-wrong-because-many-folk.html.
3 See infra Part I.B.
4 See Sarah Burstein, Visual Invention, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 169, 172 (2012); Jason J. Du
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the significant differences between utility patents and design patents,
the only people eligible to prosecute design patents are those who meet
5
the PTO's scientific and engineering eligibility requirements. Thus, if
you have an undergraduate degree in nuclear engineering, biochemistry,
pharmacology, or computer engineering, you are eligible to sit for the
patent bar and to prosecute design patents; if your undergraduate degree
is in product, fashion, or industrial design, you cannot.
This is facially unreasonable, and it is also bad policy. The number
of design patent applications has been increasing, 6 but there is no reason
to think that biologists will assist in drafting better design patents than
will actual designers. Rather, the opposite is likely to be true. Indeed,
the PTO itself appears to think that this is the case, since it has a
demonstrated preference for hiring people with design backgrounds to
examine design patents. 7 If any educational qualifications are likely to
increase the quality of design patent prosecutions, they are certainly
ones related to design.
Moreover, limiting the number of people who can prosecute design
patents artificially drives up the costs of obtaining them. This means
that some creators will have to forego design patent protection because
they cannot afford the fees. While more expensive design patents may
not be a bad thing, 8 the additional costs associated with obtaining a
design patent should come from PTO filing and maintenance fees rather
than attorneys' fees. Relatedly, only members of the patent bar can
initiate challenges to granted patents via the PTO's interpartesand post
grant review systems. 9 This means that clearing the system of low
quality design patents is also more expensive than it ought to be.
Finally, and critically, the PTO's eligibility rules have a disparate
0
impact on the number of women who can prosecute design patents.'
The patent bar is heavily skewed towards men. Men account for about
70% of patent attorneys, even higher than their share of the American
bar as a whole.1 1 This added skew arises in part from the
overrepresentation of men in the science and engineering fields that are
eligible for the patent bar.
Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design Patent Standard, 45
GONZ. L. REV. 531 (2009).
5 William Hubbard, Razing the Patent Bar, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 404 (2017); Corey B. Blake,
Ghost of the Past: Does the USPTO's Scientific and Technical Background Requirement Still
Make Sense, 82 TEX. L. REV. 735 (2004).
6 See infra Part I.C.
7 See infra Part III.B.
8 Christopher Buccafusco, Mark A. Lemley & Jonathan S. Masur, Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE
L.J. 75 (2018).
9 Wright, supra note 1, at 138.
10 See infra Part III.D.
II Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Gender Diversity in the Patent Bar, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.

PROP. L. 67, 80 (2014).
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By contrast, men only account for about half of current law school
graduates, and they make up only about 30% of undergraduate design
majors. 12 By constricting the pipeline to the patent bar to fields that are
disproportionately male, the science and engineering rules unfairly and
irrationally restrict access to the profession for a considerable number of
women. In doing so, the PTO's eligibility rules produce worse patents
that are more costly to obtain and challenge, and the benefits of these
additional costs, in terms of higher attorneys'
fees, are
disproportionately distributed to men.
To solve the problem, the PTO could adopt a number of different
approaches. 13 The PTO could incorporate design-related undergraduate
degrees within its list of eligible fields. This approach would allow
designers to draft and prosecute both design and utility patents, although
this might cause some concerns. To further refine this approach, the
PTO could issue a registration that is limited to design patent
prosecution. Alternatively, the PTO could hive off design patent
prosecution from utility patent prosecution and have separate eligibility
rules for each area.
The PTO seems to be doing something similar internally with
examiners, so we suspect that it could do the same for patent
prosecutors. This approach would not be a novel concept for the PTO. It
already has different requirements for trademark prosecutors; they do
not need to jump the additional hurdle of passing a PTO examination
before being permitted to prosecute trademarks. The PTO could develop
a hybrid approach for design patents where everyone with an
undergraduate degree in any field would be eligible to sit for a design
patent-specific bar exam. In another permutation of a wholly separate
design patent bar, the eligibility rules could mirror the current
framework with a Category A and Category B, and these categories
could be directed exclusively to design-related undergraduate degrees.
In Part I, we introduce design patents, design patent prosecution,
and the PTO's educational eligibility rules for joining the patent bar.
Part II then canvasses the emerging legal and economic literature on
occupational licensing to provide theoretical and empirical grounding
for assessing the costs and benefits of educational eligibility rules. In
Part III, we make the normative case for why the PTO's rules are not
cost-justified. In particular, we explain their facial irrationality, their
harmfulness in terms of increased costs, and their disparate impact on
women's access to the profession. Finally, Part IV offers a series of
solutions that the PTO could adopt to address these problems. We
consider the relative merits of each proposal and indicate which we

12 See

infra Part III.D.

13 We discuss these at length in Part V.
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consider the strongest.
I.

THE PATENT BAR AND DESIGN PATENT PROSECUTION

A patent gives its owner the exclusive right to make, use, or sell
the invention that it discloses. 14 Unlike copyrights, however, which
emerge from the moment of fixation,' 5 or trademarks, which develop
through use, 16 patent rights must be obtained through a process called
"prosecution." 17 Inventors who want to obtain patents must submit
applications to the PTO detailing their inventions and disclosing
relevant prior art. 18 The PTO will then examine the applications to
determine whether they meet the statutory requirements, including that
they are novel and not obvious. 19 This is the case both for utility and
20
design patents.
While any registered attorney can help an author register a
copyright or a firm register a trademark, only certain people are allowed
to assist inventors with patent prosecution. 2 1 To prosecute patent
22
applications, a person must be registered to practice before the PTO.
Registration is a two-step process. Applicants must first satisfy the
eligibility requirements set forth by the PTO, and then they must pass
the patent bar exam. 23 The patent bar exam is directed to patent law and
the rules and regulations that govern practice before the PTO. 24 But to
even be able to sit for the patent bar, applicants must meet the PTO's
strict educational eligibility criteria. In almost all cases, this means that
the applicants must have an undergraduate degree in science or
engineering or be able to demonstrate that they have taken a significant

1435 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010) ("[W]hoever without authority, makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention ...infringes the patent.").
15 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression ...").
16 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("[T]he right to a
particular mark grows out of its use ....").
17 35 U.S.C. § 111(a) ("An application for a patent shall be made, or authorized to be made, by
the inventor ...in writing to the Director.").
18 Id.; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.97, 1.98 (2015).
19 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (novelty) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... the claimed
invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise
");35 U.S.C. §
available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention ....
103 (non-obviousness) ("A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding
that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.").
20 1 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 23.03 (1978).
21 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.5, 11.6, 11.7; Christi J. Guerrini, The Decline of the PatentRegistration Exam,
91 NEB. L. REV. 325, 328-29 (2012).
22 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.5-11.7.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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amount of coursework in those specific fields. 25
The PTO has never identified the precise reasoning behind the
eligibility requirements, although some surmise that they are designed
to insure patent quality and to protect consumers from unsavory
practitioners. 26 In theory, having studied computer engineering as an
undergraduate may assist patent prosecutors in drafting claims covering
microchips. Oddly, however, despite the significant differences between
utility patents and design patents, the eligibility requirements are the
same for each type of patent. Computer engineers and microbiologists
are eligible to prosecute design patents, but product designers are not.
In this Part, we first briefly discuss the nature of utility and design
patents. 27 Then, we explain the PTO's eligibility criteria for patent
prosecutors and some potential justifications for them.
A. The Differences in Nature, Scope, and RequiredDisclosures
Between Utility Patents andDesign Patents
Put in the simplest of terms, utility patents are directed to how an
invention works, 28 while design patents are directed to how an invention
looks. 29 For example, Apple has utility patents that cover efficient
battery usage, camera technology, and the "pinch-to-zoom" feature. 30 In
addition, Apple owns design patents that cover the curved rectangular
shape of the iPhone and the shape and placement of the iPhone's
"home" button. 31 Although the inventions disclosed in each of these
patents can exist in the same device, the rights are very different, and
the PTO has different requirements for each. Utility patents exist to
encourage inventors to develop functionally useful new inventions. 32 By
contrast, design patents provide incentives to create aesthetically
pleasing industrial designs. 33
25 See infra Part I.B.
26 For a history of the relationship between patent attorneys and agents, see Kara W. Swanson,
The Emergence of the ProfessionalPatentPractitioner,50 TECH. & CULT. 519 (2009).
27 See also Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, FunctionalityScreens, 103 VA. L. REV.
1293 (2017).
28 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor ....); MPEP § 1502.01 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018).
29 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) ("Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article
of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title."); MPEP § 1502.01.
30 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 B2 (filed Jan. 7, 2007) (application programming
interfaces for scrolling operations).
31See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. D593,087 S (filed July 30, 2007) (ornamental design of an electronic
device).
32 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The patent laws promote this
progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk
the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.").
33 Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 524 (1872) ("The acts of Congress which authorize
the granting of patents for designs were plainly intended to give encouragement to the decorative
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Although utility patents account for the vast majority of granted
patents each year, the numbers of design patent applications and grants
have been growing steadily. In 1995, applicants filed about 15,000
34
design patent applications, of which 11,712 were granted. Twenty
years later, however, applications had more than doubled to 39,097, as
35
had granted patents, which numbered 25,986. Design patents are not
only expanding in raw numbers. They also seem to be increasingly
36
valuable to firms' intellectual property (IP) portfolios. The recent
smartphone litigation between Apple and Samsung resulted in
enormous infringement verdicts that were largely based on Apple's
design patents. 37 Accordingly, we expect design patents' legal and
economic significance to continue to grow.
Based on the fundamental difference in the purpose of utility
patents versus design patents, it should be no surprise that the
information that must be contained in each is quite different. To obtain a
utility patent, the invention must relate to a machine, process, article of
manufacture, or composition of matter. 38 Utility patent documents
39
contain an abstract, a specification (including drawings), and claims.
The written description of the invention (part of the specification) is
quite detailed and scientific. 40 It contains sections on (1) the background
of the invention; (2) a summary of the invention with reference to other
inventions in the field (known as the "prior art"); (3) a description of the
drawings; and (4) a detailed description of the invention, sufficient to
41
teach one of skill in the relevant art how it works. The claims define
the metes and the bounds of the invention and are interpreted with
reference to the written specification, but the written description cannot
expand the meaning of the claims. 42 Most utility patents include
arts. They contemplate not so much utility as appearance, and that, not an abstract impression or
picture, but an aspect given to those objects mentioned in the acts.").
34 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2015, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
(2016), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/data/usstat.htm.
35 Id.

36 See Mark Nowatarski, The Power of Portfolio: Strong Design Patents III, IP WATCHDOG
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/08/23/the-power-of-portfolio-strong-designpatents/id=44774/.
37 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 839 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (including jury damages of $98
million).
3835 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
39 Nonprovisional (Utility) Patent Application Filing Guide, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.

https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent(2014),
4
applications/nonprovisional-utility-patent#heading- ; MPEP § 608.01 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018);
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.51, 1.72, 1.81 (2013).
40 Nonprovisional (Utility) Patent Application Filing Guide, supra note 39; MPEP §§ 2161-65;
35 U.S.C. § 112.
41 35 U.S.C. § 112.
42 Nonprovisional (Utility) Patent Application Filing Guide, supra note 39; MPEP § 2173;
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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multiple claims that establish the boundaries of the invention for
purposes of validity and infringement.
Design patents are appropriate for the ornamental design of an
article of manufacture. 4 3 Design patent claimants are asserting rights in
the novel ornamental shape or surface ornamentation of a product of
industrial design. 44 Design patents only contain a single claim, and that
claim is made by way of drawings of the claimed design. 45 More
precisely, the claim always contains the following sentence: "The
ornamental design for [the article which embodies the design or to
which it is applied] as shown. '46 The patent has no abstract or in-depth
written description; the PTO deems the drawings the best description of
the invention. 47 The drawings are not scientific in nature and disclose a
variety of views of the design, often including different perspectives and
shading of contours.4 8 Both design patents and utility patents list the
relevant prior art associated with the claimed inventions.
Whether an inventor seeks a utility patent or a design patent, she
must first submit a patent application to the PTO. Both utility and
design patent applications are characterized by class when they are
filed, 49 and the PTO assigns an examiner to the application based on the
class designation.5 0 Utility patents are typically assigned to examiners
with scientific and engineering backgrounds, while design patents are
typically assigned to examiners with backgrounds in design, the arts,
and architecture. During patent prosecution, examiners review
applications to determine whether they satisfy the various standards for
patentability, and they issue allowances or rejections of the
applications' claims. When claims are rejected, applicants may amend
their claims to make them compliant, for example, by clarifying or
narrowing their scope. Throughout prosecution, applicants' attorneys
are responsible for the back-and-forth communication with the PTO,
and they will advise applicants on strategies associated with the
interaction.

43 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) ("Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article
of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor ....
44 Id.

45Design Patent Application Guide, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
(2009),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/designpatent-application-guide#single; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.152-1.154 (2000); MPEP § 1503.
46 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.152-154. The language (and description) is added at the end of the one claim if
a special description is included for any of the drawings (e.g., a description of the look of portions
of the design which are not illustrated in the drawing, but which are claimed, such as a mirror
image of one side).
47 Id.
48 Id.

49 Overview of the U.S. Patent ClassificationSystem 3-4, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (2012),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/resources/classification/overview.pdf.
50 Id. at 15.
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B. Patent Bar EligibilityHas the Same Robust Scientific and
EngineeringRequirementsfor Both Design and Utility Patents
Although any attorney is allowed to help someone buy a piece of
property, draft a complicated trust instrument, or negotiate a corporate
merger, only certain people can represent inventors at the PTO. To
51
prosecute any type of patent on behalf of a client, you must be
registered to practice before the PTO. 52 Interestingly, to register with the
even have to be an attorney-you can qualify as a
PTO, you don't
"patent agent." 53 Whether you are a patent agent or a patent attorney,
you must take and pass the patent bar exam. 54 To do that, however, you
must meet the PTO's strict educational eligibility requirements.
In the nineteenth century, there were no limitations on prosecuting
patents, with lawyers and non-lawyers co-existing in the market for
services for inventors. 55 Over time, however, various groups began to
raise concerns (sincerely or not) about the harms caused by low quality
or dishonest practitioners. 56 In 1922, Congress responded to these
concerns by granting the Commissioner of Patents the power to require
patent agents and attorneys to demonstrate that they have "the necessary
qualifications" to render "valuable service. '57 The PTO immediately
exercised this power and required that every applicant to the bar of
registered 58 patent agents and attorneys "file proof that he is possessed
of... legal and technical qualifications. ' 59 By the middle of the
century, the PTO began requiring applicants to take and pass a separate
patent bar exam, which non-lawyer agents could only sit for if they had
a degree in engineering or physical science. 60 Eventually, the PTO
extended its educational eligibility rules to lawyers as well, and it has
continued to refine the ways of demonstrating eligibility.
In a document commonly referred to as the General Requirements
Bulletin, the PTO sets forth three categories for demonstrating the
appropriate scientific and technical qualifications. The most common
method of qualifying is under Category A, where applicants qualify if

51 Inventors are allowed to prosecute their own patents pro se.
52 37 C.F.R. § 11.10. There are two exceptions to this rule: (1)under § 11.9, a limited registration
is available for a particular application or applications upon a showing of need or justification and
"good moral character and reputation," and (2) under § 11.17, a limited registration is available
for law students prosecuting patent applications through participation in a PTO-certified law
school clinic.
53Wright, supra note 1, at 132.
54Guerrini, supra note 21, at 328.
55See Swanson, supra note 26, at 537-40.
56 Id.; Hubbard, supra note 5, at 400-01.
57 Act of February 18, 1922, ch. 58, § 3, 42 Stat. 390 (1922).
58U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Off. Gaz. Pat. Office, 971, r. 17 (Aug. 17, 1897). Registration
with the PTO had been required since 1897, id.
59 37 C.F.R. § 11.7 (2004); see also Hubbard, supra note 5, at 401.
60 Hubbard, supra note 5, at 401; Guerrini, supra note 21, at 337-38.
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they have undergraduate degrees in one of thirty-two fields. 61 This list
contains the natural and physical sciences, a variety of engineering
fields, and computer science. 62 Excluded from eligibility under
Category A are degrees in art, design, or architecture. 63
Alternatively, applicants can qualify for the patent bar under
Category B if, although they lack an engineering or science degree, they
have taken substantial coursework in these fields. 64 Usually this means
taking at least twenty-four semester hours of physics or thirty semester
hours of chemistry, or some combination of physics and chemistry plus
other scientific or engineering fields. 65 Finally, under Category C,
applicants can earn the opportunity to take the patent bar if they first
pass a comprehensive engineering exam administered by the National
Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying. 66
The PTO's eligibility requirements establish a firm limit on
people's ability to join the patent bar and prosecute patents. Unless
applicants can demonstrate substantial science or engineering education,
they simply cannot join the patent bar. The PTO does not offer any,
means by which an applicant can make a case for an exemption from
the requirements. The science and engineering requirements apply to all
patent prosecution, including design as well as utility, yet no design
fields are included among the eligible fields of study. If an applicant
qualifies for the patent bar based on an electrical engineering degree, he
can prosecute patents in electrical engineering, of course, but also in
biotech, pharmacology, astrophysics, and even design. Yet, if an
applicant has a degree in product or industrial design, she isn't allowed
to even prosecute design patents.
The PTO has never publicly explained the basis for issuance of the
General Requirements Bulletin or the disciplines identified therein. 67
Documents internal to the PTO do not appear to explain the basis
either. 68 Instead, when confronted with a legal challenge to the Bulletin,
61 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE
EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 4-8 [hereinafter GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN].

62 Id. at 4. The acceptable fields of study are: Biology, Pharmacology, Electrochemical
Engineering, Biochemistry, Physics, Engineering Physics, Botany, Textile Technology, General
Engineering, Computer Science, Aeronautical Engineering, Geological Engineering, Electronics
Technology, Agricultural Engineering, Industrial Engineering, Food Technology, Biomedical
Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, General Chemistry, Ceramic Engineering, Metallurgical
Engineering, Marine Technology, Chemical Engineering, Mining Engineering, Microbiology,
Civil Engineering, Nuclear Engineering, Molecular Biology, Computer Engineering, Petroleum
Engineering, Organic Chemistry, and Electrical Engineering.
63 Id. at 4-8.
64 Id. at 4-5.
65 Id. at 6-7.
66 Id. at 8.
67 Hubbard, supra note 5, at 398, 402 n. 104.
68 Id.
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the PTO defended it by simply stating that the Bulletin is just "an
interpretation of the agency's regulations," which the Federal Circuit
accepted. 69 The regulation to which the PTO referred is a provision with
the broadly-stated requirement that applicants must have "the legal,
scientific, and technical qualifications necessary for him or her to render
'70
applicants valuable service.
It is worth noting that the patent bar exam does not actually test
scientific or technical knowledge. Instead, the focus is on patent law,
and in particular, the procedures and rules applicable to prosecution
practice before the PTO. 7 1 The technologies that are used as examples
on the exam are generally trivially simple and do not require expertise
in a particular scientific or engineering field. Interestingly, in our
research into past patent bar exams, we have found that the exam only
tests design patents on two or three questions out of the one hundred
asked every year. 72
The PTO's educational eligibility rules for patent prosecution are
unique in federal law. 73 No other agency requires specialized knowledge
of the underlying field, including those that regulate similarly complex
subjects like antitrust, communications policy, and the environment.
Indeed, the PTO does not apply restrictions to attorneys who prosecute
trademarks before the Office. 74 There are procedures and rules
applicable to trademark prosecution as well, but trademark prosecutors
do not need to take an entrance exam: "[a]ny individual who is an active
member in good standing of the highest court of any State may
represent others before the USPTO in trademark matters. ' 75 Lawyers do
not need a degree in environmental science to represent clients before
the Environmental Protection Agency, nor do they need a degree in
economics when appearing before the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice. The PTO alone, and only for patent
prosecution, 76 demands particular educational qualifications.

69 Premysler v. Lehman, 71 F.3d 387, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
70 37 C.F.R. § 11.7 (a)(2)(ii) (2005).
71 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 61, at 18-19.
72 For past exam questions and answers, see Past Exams Questions and Answers, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/past-exams-questions-and-answers (last visited Jan.
27, 2019).
73 Guerrini, supra note 21, at 328.
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
PAT.
&
Trademark Practitioner, U.S
74 Becoming
a
https://www.uspto.gov/leaming-and-resources/patent-and-trademark-practitioners/becomingtrademark-practitioner (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
75Id.; see also 37 CFR § 11.14(a) (2008) ("Any individual who is an attorney... may represent
others before the Office in trademark and other non-patent matters. An attorney is not required to
apply for registration or recognition before the Office in trademark and other non-patent
matters.").
76 In addition, lead counsel in Patent Trial and Appeal Board proceedings must also be a member
of the patent bar. For more on this, see infra notes 162-170.
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C. Composition of the Patent Bar

The number of people registered to practice before the PTO is
relatively small. According to the PTO, there are only about 45,000
active registrations. 77 Others estimate that this number is closer to
25,000 when retirement and death are factored in.78 With decreasing law
school enrollments since 2010, it also seems likely that the number of
new patent attorneys may not be able to keep pace with retirements,
meaning that the overall number of practitioners will shrink. 79 As recent
analysis of the patent bar has shown, its membership is made up almost
entirely of people with backgrounds in chemical, mechanical,
biological, or electrical fields.8 0 Patent bar members with training in
these fields account for about 95% of those eligible to prosecute patents
at the PTO. 81
This small group of people is responsible for handling the huge
and growing number of prosecutions. In a recent five-year period, the
PTO granted an average of 300,000 combined patents per year, or a
total of 1.5 million, 82 and issued patents represent only a fraction of the
number of applications filed. In the same five-year period, close to three
million applications were filed. 83 Currently, design patents only account
for about 10% of these numbers, but as we noted above, design patent
applications and grants are both increasing as well. 84
These data indicate that while the number of utility and design
patent applications is likely to rise over the next decade, there will be
fewer members of the patent bar to prosecute them, and the bar's
membership will be made up almost exclusively of scientists and
engineers. Furthermore, because people with design backgrounds are
ineligible to join the patent bar, the increasing number of design patent
applications will be handled by people without any expertise in the
field. Ultimately, the pool of patent prosecutors will remain small,
because the PTO's eligibility rules operate as an occupational licensing
regime that restricts access to the profession.

77Pat.PractitionerHome Page, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/
(last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
78Crouch, supra note 2.
79 Kenneth L. Port, Molly R. Littman & Lucas Hjelle, Where Have All the PatentLawyers Gone?
Long Time Passing..., 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 193, 197-98 (2015).
80 Ralph D. Clifford, Thomas G. Field, Jr. & Jon R. Cavicchi, A Statistical Analysis of the Patent
Bar: Where Are the Software-Savvy PatentAttorneys?, 11 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 223, 229 (2010).
81 Id.

82 U.S. Patent Activity Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
(2019), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h-counts.htm. The most recent fiveyear period for which data is available was used (2011-2015).
83 Id.
84 Id.
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II. THE PATENT BAR AS OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
In an increasing number of professions, people are subject to
licensing restrictions that condition access to the occupation on
satisfying various criteria. 85 Lawyers, doctors, and dentists have long
needed licenses to practice their professions. 86 More recently, however,
states have begun to require licenses for a broad range of professions,
including auctioneers, interior designers, and hair braiders. 87 In order to
legally practice hair braiding, for example, people in many states must
attend two years of cosmetology school, pass an exam, and pay yearly
dues.8 8 While some of these licensing regimes probably seem prudent,
others are intuitively absurd.
The PTO's science and engineering educational requirements are
also a form of occupational licensing.8 9 People are prevented from
representing clients as patent attorneys or agents unless they meet the
criteria established by the PTO. 90 The question we address in this
Article is whether applying these requirements to design patent
prosecutors is prudent or absurd. Here, we review recent economic and
legal literature on the costs and benefits of occupational licensing
regimes. The next Part will analyze how these issues apply to the PTO's
eligibility requirements.
Ultimately, the appropriateness of a given licensing regime turns
on whether the benefits it produces exceed the costs that it generates.
Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, was strongly skeptical of the
most salient licensing regimes of his day-lengthy apprenticeship
programs. 91 According to Smith:
The patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his
hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity
in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbor, is a
plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest
encroachment upon the just liberty both of92 the workman, and of
those who might be disposed to employ him.
Although Smith was chiefly concerned with the two major costs
that licensing regimes produce-limits on service providers and limits
on consumers of their services-he also seemed to appreciate that the
85Morris M. Kleiner, OccupationalLicensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 190 (2000).
86 See Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals
and the Emergence of OccupationalLicensing Regulation, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 723, 730 (2005).
87 Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels By Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1093, 1096 (2014).
88 Id. at 1106.
89 These issues are reviewed in the utility patent context at length in Hubbard, supra note 5, at
393-98.
90 See supra Part I.B.
91 See Kleiner, supra note 85, at 189.
92 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Book 1, Ch. 10, Part II) (1776).
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issue isn't one-sided. The freedom to practice one's chosen profession
must be weighed against its propensity to cause injury to one's
neighbor. Although licensing regimes inhibit the supply of laborers and
increase the costs of their services, they may also ensure that laborers
are more skilled. Contemporary economic analysis has begun to offer
guidance on how to identify and balance the tradeoffs between
restricting labor supply and improving service quality.
A. The PotentialBenefits of OccupationalLicensing Regimes
In both law and economics, we generally begin with the
assumption that markets for goods or services will be efficient and will
not require intervention to ensure that those goods and services are
optimally provided in society. 93 Only when we predict certain market
failures does regulation become appropriate. Occupational licensing
regimes interfere with the general operation of the market for
professional services, so they are justified only to the extent that they
cure certain market failures. 94 Here, we identify two market failures that
may arise in markets for professional services.
1. Information Asymmetries
When you go to the store to buy a new suit, you can tell a lot about
the quality of the garment by looking at it, touching it, and trying it on. 95
You can tell if it's well or shoddily made, and you can compare it to
other suits of varying prices to choose the price/quality ratio that is
appropriate for your tastes and wallet. Perhaps after you wear the suit
once or twice you'll, you will realize that it wasn't, in fact well made,
but your investment will not have been too great, and you'll know not to
purchase from that company in the future.
None of these things may be true, however, when you are choosing
a doctor. 96 You are likely to have a difficult time telling which of two
surgeons is the more skilled or if the higher fees that one is charging are
related to greater talent or care. If you choose poorly, the consequences
for you may be catastrophic, but you may not even know if you've
made a poor choice. By the time you learn that a doctor's advice to
drink a pint of fish oil a day wasn't so wise, you won't be able to do

See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (explaining how,
in markets without transaction costs, goods will tend to flow efficiently to the highest valuing
users).
94 Edlin & Haw, supra note 87.
95 Clothing generally has attributes of what economists call "search goods" and "experience
goods." See Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection
Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 61 (2010).
96 Physicians' skills and many other services are classic "credence goods," where consumers may
have a difficult time observing quality. Winand Emons, Credence Goods Monopolists, 19 INT'L.
J. INDUS. ORG. 375 (2001).
93
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anything about it. Although reputational information may alleviate some
of these challenges, many could remain.
In markets for medical professionals, then, we might expect
potential market failures to arise from information asymmetries between
sellers and consumers. 97 Consumers may not have or be able to obtain
sufficient information about the quality of service that they are
obtaining. 9 8 Thus, consumers with preferences for high quality service
will not be able to find high quality providers. Anne may have studied
for much longer, and although she is a better physician than Bob,
would-be patients cannot be confident that this is the case. Anne,
knowing this, will have diminished incentives to invest in providing
higher quality (and, thus, more costly) service. 99
Occupational licensing regimes can mitigate information
asymmetries by enabling consumers to find providers that match their
preferences. 100 If the state conditions medical practice on learning about
medical science and demonstrating that knowledge through a rigorous
exam, consumers can be confident that all licensed doctors have some
minimal level of skill. Further, because high quality service providers
know that consumers can find them, the providers will be motivated to
invest in their skills.
For the licensing regime to minimize information asymmetries,
though, the licensing rules must provide a strong proxy for the skills
that consumers desire. 10 1 If obtaining a medical license were
conditioned on an applicant having perfect pitch, the license would not
convey any valuable information to consumers, and, as we discuss
further below, it would screen out some providers who would be
perfectly competent doctors.
2.

Establishing Quality Minimums

Occupational licensing regimes can also be valuable if there are
reasons to think that some consumers will be willing to choose poor
quality service when doing so is socially costly. 10 2 Licensing rules
prevent some professionals from offering low quality service even
though a segment of the market desires it. The state may choose to
interfere in markets for services paternalistically because it believes that
consumers will make irrational choices as a matter of their own
welfare. 103 Alternatively, the state may establish quality minimums
97 Id. at 376.

98 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
99 Edlin & Haw, supra note 87, at 1116.
100Id. at 1115-16.
101Hubbard, supra note 5, at 397.
102See Edlin & Haw, supra note 87, at 1116.
103 Hubbard, supra note 5, at 395.
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because consumers' choices will produce negative externalities for the
rest of society. 104
In economics and in law, we generally assume that consumers are
best positioned to make choices that maximize their own welfare and
that people should have autonomy to choose how to spend their
money. 10 5 There may be reasons for the state to be worried that
consumers will make poor choices. Consumers may be duped into
choosing low quality/low cost service because they think they're getting
a good deal when really they're getting scammed. Or consumers may be
subject to systematic biases that cause them to inappropriately evaluate
certain kinds of risks. 106 For example, people often struggle to rationally
assess non-economic risks in monetary terms. 107 Thus, although some
people might be willing to accept the increased risks from hiring a
cheap, unlicensed surgeon, state licensing laws prevent them from doing
SO.
Consumers may also make choices that are fine for themselves
individually but costly for society as a whole. 108 Consider someone with
the flu who seeks treatment from an unqualified physician. 109 Whether
or not this decision is good for the patient who seeks treatment, it could
be disastrous for other people if the physician's "treatment" allows the
disease to spread more quickly or more maliciously. Here, the provision
of low quality service generates negative externalities for the rest of
society, and the state may have a role to play in preventing consumers
from making these choices. By ensuring that all physicians meet some
minimum level of quality, the state's licensing regime can minimize
externality-generating activities.
3.

Evidence of Higher Quality Service?
Although information asymmetries, consumer biases, and negative
externalities can provide theoretical justifications for occupational
licensing regimes, the empirical evidence connecting licensing in
improved service quality is ambiguous at best." 10 Some studies indicate
that licensing regimes are correlated with higher quality service, 1 1 but
0

1 4 Id. at 395 96.
105See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Matthew D. Adler, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE

L.J. 165 (1999).
106 See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs.
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DuKE L.J. 1603 (2013) (describing the systematic biases that affect
people's evaluations of different states).
107 JOHN BRONSTEEN, CHRISTOPHER BUCCAFUSCO & JONATHAN S. MASUR, HAPPINESS AND
THE LAW (2016).

108 Edlin & Haw, supra note 87, at 1116.
109 Hubbard, supra note 5, at 396.
110 Edlin & Haw, supra note 87, at 1116 (describing it as "murky").
III See, e.g., Sidney L. Carroll & Robert J. Gaston, OccupationalLicensing and the Quality of
Service, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 139 (1983); Carl Shapiro, Investment, Moral Hazard, and
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11 2 And some
other studies show no meaningful effects of licensing.
studies even indicate that licensing regimes are correlated with lower
quality service. 11 3 Of course, in some regulated fields like barbering and
cosmetology, figuring out how to even measure service quality seems
implausible.

B. The Costs of OccupationalLicensing
As with any regulation, occupational licensing regimes are only
appropriate if their expected benefits exceed their costs. In all cases,
entails substantial administrative and
licensing
occupational
because licensing restricts the labor
Additionally,
enforcement costs.
supply, it increases the costs of obtaining professional services.
Consumers will pay more, some consumers will be priced out of service
entirely, and some would-be service providers will be prevented from
offering their services.
1. Administrative Costs
Administering a licensing regime can be extremely costly.
Employees of the licensing body must be paid. If obtaining a license is
conditioned on passing an exam, then the licensing body must pay to
create and administer the test. Finally, the licensing body has to expend
resources enforcing the requirements and punishing violators. While
some of these expenses can be recovered from fees paid by applicants
and members of the profession, not all licensing regimes will be
internally cost-justified. Moreover, those fees must come from
somewhere, and they are likely to be passed along to consumers of the
services.
2. The Labor Supply and Consumer Prices
One of the main effects of occupational licensing is to restrict the
supply of labor in a field. Naturally, when the supply of labor shrinks,
the price of labor increases. A licensing requirement increases the costs
114
to would-be professionals who are considering entering the field. This
means that some service suppliers will decide not to enter the field,
115 This is
because obtaining the appropriate credentials is too expensive.
116
the concern that Adam Smith expressed in the passage quoted above.
Some people will be prevented from entering the field, because they

OccupationalLicensing, 53 REV. ECON. STUD. 843 (1986).
112See, e.g., Joshua D. Angrist & Jonathan Guryan, Teacher Testing, Teacher Education, and
Teacher Characteristics,94 AM. ECON. REv. 241 (2004).
113Edlin & Haw, supra note 87, at 1117.
114Hubbard, supra note 5, at 396.
115 Id.
116See SMITH, supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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cannot obtain or afford the requisite qualifications. 117
Relative to an unregulated market, then, there will be fewer
suppliers in a licensed field.' 18 With fewer competitors, suppliers with
the license will be able to charge higher fees for their services. 119 Those
with the appropriate qualifications can engage in rent seeking and
extract a larger proportion of the gains from trade than they otherwise
could.
Ultimately, because prices increase when low cost suppliers are
barred from the labor supply, some consumers will be entirely priced
out of the market. 120 Although some consumers would have been
willing to pay for dentistry or hair braiding at the price supplied by an
unregulated market, they will be unable or unwilling to pay for those
services at the regulated price. These unconsummated transactions
produce deadweight loss for society. 12 1
While the empirical support for the effects of occupational
licensing on improved service quality is weak, there is substantial
evidence that licensing regimes increase consumer costs. 122 Studies
have found that consumers can pay between 7% and 18% more when
occupational licensing restrictions are in place. 123 Obviously, the stricter
the licensing requirement and the more it impacts the labor supply, the
greater the price increase. 124
C. Lessonsfor Licensing
One can make a valid case for the benefits of occupational
licensing, but those benefits must always be traded off against the
regime's costs. Based on the theoretical and empirical literature just
discussed, we can learn some lessons about when occupational licensing
is most likely to be cost-justified. 12 5 First, there should be a
demonstrable market failure caused by information asymmetries,
consumer biases, or negative externalities. Without some likely social
welfare loss, there isn't a reason to endure the costs of occupational
licensing. Next, the licensing regime should accurately proxy for the
lack of skill that generates the predicted welfare loss. Requiring
practitioners to have certain skills or attributes only makes sense if they
are closely related to essential features of the service. Finally, any
117 Kleiner, supra note 85, at 192-93; Edlin & Haw, supra note 87, at 1115.
118 Carroll & Gaston, supranote 111, at 139.
119Kleiner, supra note 85, at 192.

120Edlin & Haw, supra note 87, at 1114 ("If licensing increases consumer prices, then some
consumers must go without professional services ... .
121Id. at 1115.
122Kleiner, supra note 85, at 194-96.
123See Edlin & Haw, supra note 87, at 1113-14.
124Id. at 1114 (noting that prices are higher when licensing boards are more heavy-handed).
125We have adapted these lessons from Hubbard's similar list. Hubbard, supra note 5, at 397.
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regulation should only be as strict as is necessary to correct the market
failure. If a looser regulation or another mechanism can solve the
problem at a lower cost, then it should be preferred. The deadweight
losses associated with occupational licensing should be as small as
possible.
III. APPLYING THE PTO's ELIGIILITY RULES TO DESIGN PATENTS IS
IRRATIONAL, HARMFUL, AND UNFAIR

The PTO's science and engineering eligibility requirements
represent an occupational licensing scheme similar to the ones that
apply to doctors, lawyers, dentists, and cosmetologists. Having
considered the potential benefits and costs of occupational licensing
regimes, we now analyze the application of the eligibility rules to
design patent prosecutors in light of those factors. In our view, the
eligibility limitation has virtually zero benefit, and it produces
enormous costs.
The PTO's eligibility requirements appear to have been issued in
response to concerns related to the complicated, technical nature of
utility patent applications, and one can understand the reasoning behind
them.126 The notion that someone who studied electrical engineering as
an undergraduate will draft better patent applications for circuits or
27
diodes than someone who studied sociology is, at least, plausible. 1 But
it's not plausible to believe that the electrical engineer will draft better
patent applications for the shape of sneakers or smart phones than
someone who studied industrial design. In this Part, we argue that the
PTO's eligibility rules, as applied to design patent prosecutors, are
facially unreasonable, create bad policy for the design patent system,
and likely work an injustice against women in the profession.
A. Is There a Market Failure?
The basic justification for occupational licensing regimes is their
capacity to cure market failures brought on by asymmetric information,
bias, or negative externalities. 128 Accordingly, we must first determine
whether any such failure is likely to exist with design patent
prosecution. 129 We believe the case for a market failure is weak.
Design patent prosecution is a service similar to those offered by
attorneys in other fields, and as with most services, there is a possibility
that clients will be in a poor position to distinguish between high and
126See supra Part I.
127There is good reason to question the rationality and appropriateness of the eligibility
requirements as applied to utility patents in the landscape of modem day patent prosecution. That
is not the primary focus in this essay, though. But see Hubbard, supra note 5.
128See supra Part H.A.
129Again, we restrict our discussion to design patents.
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low quality service providers. 130 As we explained above, this could lead
to clients getting duped or to insufficient incentives to invest in high
quality service.13 1 It's certainly possible that this could happen in design
patent prosecution, and there is some historical evidence that it may
have once been the case. Some have claimed that the demise of design
patents throughout the twentieth century was based in part on inventors
being duped into obtaining cheap but weak design patents instead of
expensive but strong utility patents. 132
We suspect that the risks here are not especially high, however. In
the 1800s and well into the 1900s, patent prosecution was still a new
and developing practice area. 133 Concerns about patent quality then
would have been based on a very different professional landscape than
they are now. Today, patent prosecution is a well-established practice
area, and the clients who need these services are generally sophisticated,
repeat players. Many parties who are seeking design patent prosecution
are reasonably sophisticated professional actors. Many, in fact, are
enormous corporations and are repeat players at the PTO.1 34
In addition, there are many law firms around the country, big and
small, that offer patent prosecution services, and many corporations
have their own patent prosecution departments that provide these
services in-house. To the extent that these law firms and corporations
think that patent prosecutors should have scientific or technical
credentials, they can insist upon their prosecuting attorneys possessing
them. Once hired, patent prosecutors can be assigned to applications
that are directly related to their technical background. When
corporations employ outside counsel for patent prosecution services,
they are not in the dark about the lawyers they hire. Lawyers'
biographical details are publicly available through various sources. If a
corporation believes that certain skills or credentials are important (and
worth paying for), it can seek outside law firms or particular attorneys
within firms that have them.
Also, unlike utility patents, design patents applications are very
simple documents. Design patents only include a single claim for the
ornamental shape of an article of manufacture, along with several
drawings of the article. Although there are important strategies
associated with design patent claiming, 135 many of them are
comprehensible to laypeople and are no more difficult than the sorts of
130See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
131See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
132On alleged misbehavior of patent prosecutors generally, see Swanson, supranote 26, at 530.
133 Id. at 531.
134The top five firms (Microsoft, Apple, Samsung, Xerox, and Sony) apply for more than 50% of
one class of design patents. Jason Du Mont & Mark Janis, Virtual Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REv. 107, 136 (2013).
135 Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REv. 123 (2018).
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136
things attorneys do for clients in many other legal fields.
Finally, but essentially, attorneys' ethical obligations are likely to
deter inappropriate behavior without having to resort to occupational
licensing. Attorneys in every state are bound by a code of professional
responsibility including canons of ethics that require lawyers to
competently represent their clients. 137 This includes only taking on
matters in practice areas for which one has the skills to provide quality
138
legal services.
Low quality design patent prosecution is also unlikely to generate
sufficient negative externalities, or at least not the sort that are curable
by occupational licensing. While low quality design patents are
certainly costly to society, 139 we might hope that applicants' preferences
for high quality design patents will generally overlap with society's
interest in high quality design patents. If applicants hire unqualified
attorneys, they may run a greater risk that their patents will be
invalidated. This will give them some incentive to invest in high quality
attorneys who will draft high quality patents.
Of course, it might often be the case that applicants in fact desire
low quality patents, in the sense that they are overbroad or insufficiently
novel.140 But in these cases, the attorneys aren't giving the clients low
quality legal services the way that a quack physician might mistreat a
communicative disease. Instead, clients could be seeking out high
quality attorneys to help them draft low quality patents. 141 Although this
practice certainly produces negative externalities for society, these costs
are not ones that arise from low quality practitioners who don't
understand patent prosecution. Accordingly, there is no reason to
believe that an occupational licensing regime that aims at eliminating
low quality design patent prosecutors would have any effect on strategic
overclaiming.
We see little reason to think that there is a sizable market failure
associated with low quality design patent prosecutors. Neither
information asymmetries nor negative externalities seem especially
136For example, tax law and estate planning are almost certainly more complicated that design
patent prosecution.
137MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6, EC 6-3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("While
the licensing of a lawyer is evidence that he has met the standards then prevailing for admission
to the bar, a lawyer generally should not accept employment in any area of the law in which he is
not qualified.").
138Id.

139 Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 107 (2016); Mark P. McKenna & Katherine
J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2013);
Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 8, at 108.
140 Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 8, at 89 (explaining how costly screens can weed
out negative social value design patents).
141Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORD. L. REv. 3091, 3123 (2014); Stephen
Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77
(2014).

2019]

THE DESIGN PATENT BAR

285

costly or potentially curable by an occupational licensing regime.
Moreover, as we explain below, we see absolutely no reason to think
that any risk of design patent prosecution market failure can be cured by
limiting practice to those who studied science or engineering.
B. The Rules Are Facially Unreasonable
Even assuming there is some possible market failure associated
with design patent prosecution, we must consider whether the PTO's
eligibility rules are a cost-justified response. We need do nothing more
than state the situation for its irrationality to be apparent. People who
majored in biology, chemistry, and civil engineering are permitted to
prosecute design patents, but people who majored in industrial,
product, orfashion design are not.
Design patents claim the ornamental appearance of articles of
manufacture, and if specialized knowledge about design appearances is
necessary, 14 2 then that expertise is likely held by designers rather than
scientists or engineers. One could imagine that design patent
prosecutors should be able to advise clients on the existence and scope
of prior art designs that may read on their claims. For example, when
prosecutors run prior art searches, they should be able to advise their
clients on the likelihood that their claims are likely to be found invalid
because previous designs anticipate them. Design patent prosecutors
should be able to explain different drafting conventions, including
dotted line and broken line claiming strategies and the costs and benefits
of using them. 143 There is no reason to think that the subject-matter
specific skills related to design patent prosecution are held by
pharmacologists and biochemists. If anyone is more likely to be able to
assist a designer, then that person probably has a background in design
herself. To the extent that the patent bar exam primarily tests procedural
rules about practice before the PTO, 144 that procedural knowledge, and
its application to design, is just as understandable to those who studied
design as those who studied science or engineering.
One might argue that at least one class of patent-bar-eligible
prosecutors-mechanical engineers-may be well-placed to serve
design patent applicants. While that may be true, it hardly provides a
satisfactory justification for the regulation. First, although mechanical
engineers can prosecute design patents, so can all of the other people
who qualify under the other science or engineering degrees. That one
group is rationally included does not excuse either the irrational
142 Below we discuss whether such specialized knowledge is important for design patents. See

infra notes 201-202.
143 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. The patent bar exam appears to test design
patents very lightly, with usually only a couple of questions per year.
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inclusion of some groups (e.g. biologists and chemists) or the irrational
exclusion of other groups (e.g. designers). Moreover, to the extent that
mechanical engineers may possess expertise in design, it likely relates
to the utilitarian or functional aspects of design rather than design's
ornamental aspects. Yet these ornamental, aesthetic aspects of design
145 Functional aspects of
are precisely those protected by design patents.
146
patents.
design
by
designs should not be protected
Ultimately, the most damning evidence of the irrationality of the
PTO's patent eligibility rules is that the PTO itself does not apply them
internally. When the PTO hires design patent examiners-the
administrators who will determine whether patents should issue-it
does not look for applicants with science and engineering
backgrounds.1 47 Logically, it looks for applicants who understand
design. In a recent job posting for design patent examiners, the PTO
sought "talented individuals with degrees or education in
Industrial/Product Design, Architecture, Applied Arts, Graphic Design,
Fine/Studio Arts."' 148 When it interviews, the PTO asks design patent
examiner applicants questions about visual similarities between
different designs. 14 9 Applicants are evaluated on spatial reasoning tests
and their ability to describe drawings in words. 150 This evidence shows
that the PTO itself does not believe that science or engineering degrees
provide the best background for understanding design patent
applications.
C. The Rules Are Harmful to Design Patents
Not only are the PTO's eligibility rules facially unreasonable, they
are also a bad idea. The patents that the PTO issues are no better for
being drafted by scientists and engineers; they are more expensive, and
they might be worse. The eligibility rules increase the costs of obtaining
design patents, and they also increase the costs of challenging bad
design patents. The rules are a rare example of a regulation that has
145See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 524 (1872).
146See Buccafisco & Lemley, supranote 27, at 1301.
147 See, e.g., Info Session For Design Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
(Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/events/info-session-design-patent-examinerpositions.
148Id.
149The website Glassdoor allows applicants to post about job interviews, and it includes a
number of posts from people who have applied for design patent examiner positions with the
PTO. See, e.g., US Patent and Trademark Office Design PatentExaminer Interview Questions,
GLASSDOOR (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.glassdoor.com/lnterview/US-Patent-and-TrademarkOffice-Design-Patent-Examiner-Interview-Questions-EIIE41351.0,30 KO31,53.htm; US Patent
and Trademark Office Design Patent Examiner Interview Questions, GLASSDOOR (June 10,
https://www.glassdoor.com/Interview[US-Patent-and-Trademark-Office-Design-Patent2016),
Examiner-Interview-Questions-EIIE41351.0,30_K031,53.htm.
150 See Sarah Burstein, Design Patent Myths -- On Examiners and Expertise, FAC. LOUNGE (Oct.
30, 2013, 8:04 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/10/design-patent-examiners.html.
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virtually no upside and considerable downside. 5 1
Like other occupational licensing restrictions, the PTO's eligibility
rules limit the supply of patent agents and attorneys who are eligible to
assist applicants.1 52 It is an axiomatic economic principle that when the
supply of a good is constricted, its price tends to rise. 153 Thus, we can
expect that the 43,000 active registered patent agents and attorneys can
charge substantially higher prices for their services than they could in a
fully competitive market. 154 Because the PTO restricts competition, the
attorneys who are eligible to prosecute patents charge higher fees and
make more money.
The higher fees associated with limited competition likely have a
large effect on would-be applicants. Currently, attorneys' fees make up
the predominant share of the costs of obtaining a design patent. 55 This
will have two significant effects. First, attorneys and agents will capture
a larger share of the gains from trade than they would in an unregulated
market for prosecution services. That means less money in the pockets
of designers to invest in their work. Second, it is likely that many
designers are foregoing design patent protection because they cannot
afford the inflated fees. If the occupational regulation has the standard
effect on prices that these restrictions do in other areas (7-20%
increase), then for some designers, the higher price could be the
difference between getting protection and going without it. 156
While attorneys' fees for pursuing design patent protection are
unnecessarily inflated, filing and maintenance fees are conversely too
cheap. As one of us has argued elsewhere, 157 there are too many low
quality design patents that produce negative social value, and they
should be screened out by higher filing fees. 158 While occupational
restrictions will technically achieve these results, they do so through a
manifestly worse channel than other options. Instead, negative social
value design patents should be screened out with higher application fees
and maintenance fees. 159 There are so many bad design patents in part
because the PTO doesn't charge enough to obtain rights, and it doesn't
151 Normally administrative agencies face a difficult task when implementing rules, because those
rules have both costs and benefits. Figuring out how to weigh costs and benefits is a tricky task.
But here, the PTO's eligibility rules have only costs and no benefits.
152See supra Part II.
153 See Hubbard, supra note 5, at 396.
154 There is some evidence that patent attorneys make more money than other attorneys. Hubbard
notes, for example, that the median income for all attorneys is about $115,000 per year, while the
median income for patent attorneys is about $175,000. See Hubbard, supra note 5, at 387-88.
155 Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 8, at 87.
156 Thus, there could be many designs that have low private value to their creators but positive
social value that do not receive protection. See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent
Examination,2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010).
157 See generally Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 8.
158 Id. at 112.
159 Id. at 119.
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charge anything to maintain them. 160 Increasing these fees could provide
the PTO with greater resources to hire more examiners and to engage in
more robust examination. 161 The heightened attorneys' fees that come
from PTO's eligibility rules, by contrast, simply enrich a select group of
agents and attorneys. Thus, whether you think obtaining design patents
should be cheaper or more expensive, the PTO's eligibility rules are a
bad idea.
Importantly, the PTO's eligibility rules don't just raise costs for
applicants; they also increase the costs for parties interested in
challenging bad design patents. Congress has created various
administrative mechanisms for challenging patents, including inter
partes review and post grant review. 16 2 If someone believes that a patent
was granted improperly, for example, because it wasn't novel or
nonobvious, she can institute various administrative proceedings before
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). 163 The PTAB can take a
"second look" at the patent, and it has the authority to cancel one or
more of the claims in it.164 These proceedings are vastly cheaper than
full-scale district court litigation, so 65they substantially diminish the
difficulty of getting rid of bad patents. 1
Although virtually all of the attention paid to inter partes review
and post grant review has focused on their application to utility
167
patents, 166 these procedures are also applicable to design patents.
Given the ease with which design patents are granted, we suspect that
there may be substantial opportunities for parties to request them. But
just as you need a member of the patent bar to get a design patent, you
also need a member of the patent bar to challenge one before the
PTAB. 168 The lead counsel in an inter partes review or post grant review
challenge must be a member of the patent bar.
Accordingly, in the same way that the eligibility rules mean that
attorneys and agents can charge higher prices to applicants, they also
affect the prices that attorneys can charge to challengers. And it's
possible that challengers will be even more sensitive to small
differences in price than applicants. Applicants can obtain affirmative
exclusive rights to make and sell their designs, but challengers can only
160 Id.
161 Id.

162See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2013) (inter partes review); 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012) (post grant review).
163 35 U.S.C. § 311; 35 U.S.C. § 321; see also Hubbard,supra note 5, at 413.
164 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
165 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: Challenging
Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 235, 236 (2015).
166 See, e.g., Oil States Energy Serv., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018)
(holding that IPR does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment).
167 See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Miller Int'l, Ltd., Case IPR2015-00416 (P.T.A.B. June 14, 2016)
(finding a design patent on a warning symbol obvious and invalid).
16S 37 C.F.R. § 42.10(a), (c) (2015); see also Hubbard, supra note 5, at 414.
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cancel one or more claims of an existing patent. 69 While the
cancellation presumably provides some benefit to the challenger, the
challenger cannot recoup the total social good that it has generated for
competitors and consumers. 70 Thus, to the extent that the PTO's
eligibility rules make challenging patents more costly, they further
reduce the incentives for parties to engage in this socially valuable
process.
The costs associated with the PTO's rules are pretty clear. Other
than an indirect mechanism for screening out some negative social
value rights, we can see no tangible benefits to offset them. Limiting the
practice of medicine to those who have gone to medical school and
passed various examinations almost certainly increases the overall
quality of patient care. The same is also likely true of limits on
practicing law. It may even be the case that undergraduates who studied
science and engineering fields will make for better utility patent
prosecutors. But we can think of no plausible grounds to believe that
limiting design patent prosecution to people who studied science or
engineering would be a good thing.
As we explained above, if specialized knowledge of design is
important to design patent prosecution, there is no reason to think that
patent-bar-eligible attorneys have it. And if such knowledge isn't
important, then there is no reason to limit the field to a certain class of
people. If anything, allowing biologists or geological engineers to
advise on design patents may produce worse patents. 17'
D. The Rules Likely Limit Opportunitiesfor Women in the Profession
By limiting patent bar eligibility to people who studied science and
engineering, the PTO allows patent-eligible attorneys to charge higher
fees for the services. That's bad. But what makes it even worse is that
the people benefitted by these rules are disproportionately men. 172 This
is another example of how the economic opportunities associated with
STEM fields tend to favor men rather than women. While the PTO is
making efforts to improve the representation of women among patent
holders, 73 its own policies likely limit opportunities for women to
169 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
170Dreyfuss, supra note 165, at 239 (suggesting that the public could bring IPR and PGR
challenges to patents when its interests diverge from those of the patent holder's rivals).
171Blake, supra note 5, at 755.
172Vishnubhakat, supra note 11, at 67.
173 Memorandum on the Study of Diversity Among Patent Applicants by the U.S. Pat. &
Trademark
Off.
(2015),
available
at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Determination%20on%2Diversity/2Oof%2
OApplicants.pdf. Improving the representation of women among patent holders is a goal with
which we entirely agree and are, ourselves, working towards. See Cardozo/Google Patent
Diversity Project, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. L., https://cardozo.yu.edu/programscenters/cardozo-google-patent-diversity-project.
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practice patent law.
A recent estimate by Saurabh Vishnubhakat indicates that the
patent bar is currently about 70% men. 174 This is a greater percentage of
associates
men than among current law students (-50%),175 law firm
77
(-55%),176 and the American bar as a whole (-64%).1 Although a
number of reasons for this skew are possible, including the possibility
that men and women attorneys have different subject matter
preferences, one of the strongest possibilities is that the eligibility rules
prevent more women than men from practicing patent law. By limiting
access to the patent bar to people who have studied science and
engineering, the PTO's rules disparately impact women's access to the
profession.
Science and engineering fields are notoriously skewed towards
men in colleges and universities. As of 2013, women earned only 37%
178
Although women now
of undergraduate STEM degrees in the U.S.
make up more than half of undergraduate biology majors, their share of
engineering fields remains small. 79 Men make up about 80% of
undergraduate engineering students,180 while the STEM fields in which
women are more prevalent tend not to be those that are eligible for the
patent bar (like psychology and other social sciences).
Compare the numbers above to the relatively equal share of male
and female law students.' l8 Or, more to the point, consider the share of
women in undergraduate design programs. Women make up the vast
majority of students at leading industrial and fashion design schools like
Parsons School of Design (78%),182 Rhode Island School of Design
174Vishnubhakat, supra note 11, at 80. The population of registered patent attorneys and agents
is about 69% male, although the percentage of men is higher among attorneys (-73%) than agents
(-59%). Id.
'75 Elizabeth Olson, Women Make Up Majority of U.S. Law Students for First Time, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/business/dealbook/women-majority-of-uslaw-students-first-time.html.
176 A Current Glance at Women in the Law 2, AM. BAR ASS'N (Jan. 2, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current glance_statisticsjanua
ry2017.authcheckdam.pdf.
177 Id.; see also Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudesto Priorities:Diversity and GenderEquity in
Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041 (2011).
178Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, IPEDS Completions Survey, NAT'L SCI.
FOUND., https://webcaspar.nsf.gov (last updated Jan. 2017); see also Sapna Cheryan, Sianna A.
Ziegler, Amanda K. Montoya & Lily Jiang, Why Are Some STEM Fields More GenderBalanced
Than Others?, 143 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N: PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 1 (2017).
179IntegratedPostsecondary Education Data System, IPEDS Completions Survey, NAT'L SCI.
FOUND., https://webcaspar.nsf.gov (last updated Jan. 2017); see also Sapna Cheryan, Sianna A.
Ziegler, Amanda K. Montoya & Lily Jiang, Why Are Some STEM Fields More GenderBalanced
Than Others?, 143 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N: PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 1 (2017).

180 Undergraduate Enrollment in Engineering Programs, By Enrollment Status, Sex, Race or
FOUND.,
sC.
NAT'L
2003-13,
Citizenship:
and
Ethnicity,
https://www.nsfgov/statistics/2017/nsfl 731 0/static/data/tab2-9.pdf (last updated Jan. 2017).
181Olson, supra note 175.
Tuition and Acceptance Rate, PETERSON'S,
182Parsons School of Design -
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(69%),183 and Fashion Institute of Technology (85%).184 Accordingly,
the patent bar is drawing attorneys from a highly distorted pipeline of
talent. 185 If the PTO allowed in either design majors or people with any
undergraduate major, the number of women who were eligible patent
attorneys would be sure to rise.
In sum, the PTO's eligibility restrictions are entirely unrelated to
the skills that the PTO itself recognizes as potentially important to
design patent prosecution; those restrictions increase the costs of
obtaining and challenging design patents, because eligible attorneys can
charge higher fees; and the higher fees disproportionally go to men,
while women are excluded from the system. These costs are far too
great when weighed against any plausible benefits that the occupational
licensing could generate.
IV. FixING THE DESIGN PATENT BAR
As we explained above, utility and design patents are quite
different in nature, scope, and required disclosures. Nevertheless, the
PTO treats these very dissimilar patents exactly the same for purposes
of determining who is eligible to prosecute them. This does not make
sense, and it's a bad policy. Here, we propose a series of options that the
PTO could implement to improve the current situation. They range from
expanding the list of eligible fields to include design-related degrees, to
having limited registrations for design prosecutors, and to having a
separate and different set of eligibility requirements for design
prosecutors. Each of these approaches has costs and benefits, and we
assess the tradeoffs between them below.
We anticipate some resistance, both from the PTO, which would
have to implement these changes, and, especially, from the current
members of the patent bar who are the beneficiaries of the educational
requirements. Accordingly, we offer an array of proposals. We also
indicate which proposal we favor.
A. Expand the List of Degrees Included in the Eligibility Requirements
Just as science and engineering degrees are deemed relevant to
prosecuting utility patents, so too might design degrees be helpful in
prosecuting design patents. Accordingly, the PTO could consider ways
to expand the range of eligible undergraduate degrees for patent
https://www.petersons.eom/college-search/parsons-the-new-school-for-design000 10000570.aspx (last visited June 4, 2018).
183

Rhode Island School of Design, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.usnews.com/best-

colleges/risd-3409 (last visited June 4, 2018).
184

Enrollment

Data,

FASHION

INST.

TECH.,

know/enrollnent-data.php (last visited June 4, 2018).

http://www.fitnyc.edu/about/get-to-

185 On the "pipeline problem" and diversity, see THE EDUCATION PIPELINE TO THE
PROFESSIONS: PROGRAMS THAT WORK TO INCREASE DIVERSITY (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2012).
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prosecution.
1. Add Design Degrees to Category A and/or Case-by-Case Under
Category B
If some sort of educational requirements are appropriate for
ensuring patent quality, the PTO could expand the list of applicable
fields to include design, architecture, and art degrees. This would allow
those with backgrounds more closely linked to design patents to take the
existing patent bar exam and join the general patent bar.18 6 Like current
members of the patent bar, they would be entitled to prosecute patents
in any field before the PTO. So just as a person with a biology degree
can prosecute aeronautics patents or design patents, a person with an
industrial design degree could prosecute patents in biotech, computer
engineering, or design.
This change could be implemented in one or two ways. First,
design-related degrees could be added to the list of eligible degrees in
Category A. Currently, Category A allows individuals with a bachelor's
degree in one of thirty-two enumerated science, engineering, and
computer science fields to sit for the patent bar exam. Design-related
degrees could simply be added to this list. The precise degrees to be
added could be based on what appears to be the PTO's own view
regarding the backgrounds most relevant to the examination of design
patents--degrees in industrial design, product design, architecture,
applied arts, graphic design, fine arts, and studio arts. 187 Logically,
fashion design should also be included. There are likely other fields to
include as well, particularly in view of the fluid nature of design-related
degrees. The PTO has navigated the landscape well with respect to the
newer and less-established scientific and engineering degrees, and we
188
assume it could do so here too.
Another possibility is to allow individuals with design-related
training to rely on Category B, either by allowing design-related
training based on the proposed degrees added to Category A as just
described or by allowing individuals to make case-by-case arguments
for inclusion. A similar case-by-case analysis is already found in
Category B, Section xii for those people with training and expertise in
science or engineering but who do not have one of the degrees specified
in Category A:

186 We imagine that the same rules could apply to patent agents as well as patent attorneys for
this proposal.
187 See Info Sessionfor Design Patent Examiner Positions,supra note 147.
188For example, we doubt that the PTO struggled to make place for bioengineering degrees once
those became popular.
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xii. Other Training: Other factors will also be considered on a caseby-case basis with respect to scientific and technical training. OED
will consider expertise in scientific and technical training which is
equivalent to that of a Bachelor's degree in a subject listed in
Category A. An applicant without a degree listed in Category A has
the burden of establishing possession of sufficient training and
expertise in science or engineering to be equivalent to that of a
Bachelor's degree in a subject listed in Category A. Objective
evidence demonstrating that training is equivalent to training
received in courses accepted under Category A may establish such
89
equivalency. 1
Category B, Section xii could easily be amended to allow
individuals with design-related training to make a similar showing. All
that would be needed is to add the word "design" in the places where
the word "science" or "scientific" is used.
Expanding the eligibility requirements to include design-related
degrees would help ensure that patent prosecutors have "the legal,
scientific, and technical qualifications necessary for him or her to render
applicants valuable service." 190 Such expansion could also open the
patent bar to many more women, adding some long overdue diversity to
a bar that is currently about 70% men.1 9 1 The PTO itself is trying to
diversify the patent bar, and this is one way to help achieve that goal.192
This is also a way to increase the number of women holding patents.
Studies show that one of the reasons for the gender patent gap is the
cost of obtaining a patent, 193 which for design patents is largely based
on attorneys' fees. By increasing the competition among patent
prosecutors, fees should be reduced, and for some women, this will
make the difference between obtaining a patent or not.
We suspect that the members of the patent bar and the PTO itself
may object to allowing designers to prosecute utility patents for the
same reasons that they would likely object to doing away with the
educational requirements entirely. They might argue that letting mere
designers prosecute complex and important utility patents covering
pharmaceuticals would produce low quality, socially costly patents. For
purposes of this Article, we are agnostic about the importance of
science and engineering training for prosecuting utility patents, 194 but

189 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 61, at 7.

190 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2)(ii) (2005).
191Memorandum on the Study of Diversity Among Patent Applicants by the U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off., supra note 173.
192 Id.
193See Jessica Milli, et al., Equity in Innovation: Women Inventors and Patents, INST. FOR
WOMEN'S POL'Y RES. (Dec. 1, 2016), https://iwpr.org/publications/equity-in-innovation-women-

inventors-and-patents/.
194But see Hubbard, supra note 5.
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we appreciate the force of the objection and the political difficulties our
first option introduces.
2. Issue a Limited Registration for Those with Design Degrees
Accordingly, to assuage concerns that patent quality would suffer
if designers were permitted to prosecute utility patents, the PTO could
limit their registration to the prosecution of design patents. Those
possessing a degree in science or engineering would still be able to
prosecute utility and design patents, but those with design-related
degrees would only be permitted to prosecute design applications. This
solution can create a stronger connection between the background of the
prosecuting attorney and the subject matter of the applications being
prosecuted and can only serve to improve the quality of design patents.
This approach might be closest to the PTO's internal practices
regarding the examination of design patents. The PTO appears to hire
195
examiners with design-related degrees to handle design applications.
There is simply no reason why the examiners handling design
applications have backgrounds so closely aligned with the subject
matter of the applications they are examining but the prosecuting
attorneys do not.
In other contexts, the PTO has utilized limited registrations. One
example is in the context of the PTO-certified law school clinics that are
196 In
now in place in more than fifty law schools around the country.
these clinics, students work with a supervising attorney to prosecute
patent applications. The PTO issues limited registrations to these
students in order that they might file patent applications prepared as part
of their clinic work. 197 The PTO seems pleased with how this process is
going-it recently expanded the number of clinics and, thus, students
198 The PTO also utilizes
who could work under limited registrations.
199
limited registrations for non-citizen residents of the U.S.
This approach has quite a lot of appeal. It would likely enhance the
quality of design patents, because it creates a strong nexus between the
prosecuting attorney and the subject matter of the applications being
prosecuted. It does not require the PTO to wade into unchartered
territory administratively. It is consistent with the PTO's own hiring

195 See supra notes 147-150.

196 Law School Clinic Certification Program, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/leaming-and-resources/ip-policy/public-information-aboutpractitioners/law-school-clinic-l; Press Release, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., USPTO Adds
Additional Schools to Law School Clinic Certification Program (June 20, 2018), available at
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/IUSPTO/bulletins/l fSbd25.
197 Law School Clinic CertificationProgram,supra note 196. These students do not need to take
an exam directed to patent law or PTO procedure and rules.
198See supra Part II.D.
199 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supranote 61, at 1, 9.
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practices for design patent examiners, and finally, it advances a pressing
social justice issue.
B. Create SeparateProsecutionBarfor Design Patents
1. Educational Eligibility Rules for People with Design Degrees
Another approach is for the PTO to create a completely separate
track for design patent prosecutors. The PTO could hive off design
patent prosecution from utility patent prosecution and maintain separate
criteria for each. The design patent bar could mirror the general
framework of degrees, coursework, and/or training of Categories A and
B but for design-related backgrounds. The eligible fields would include
industrial design, product design, architecture, applied arts, graphic
design, fine arts, studio arts, fashion, and perhaps mechanical
engineering. Individuals with science and engineering backgrounds
(other than, perhaps, mechanical engineering) would not be eligible.
This approach would allow every design application to be prosecuted by
someone with a background strongly correlated to the subject matter of
the application just as is the case currently for utility patents. In
addition, the PTO could offer a separate bar exam that more thoroughly
tested issues related to design patent prosecution. 200
If the costs associated with the eligibility rules are believed to be
justified in order to ensure patent quality and prevent potential patentees
from being duped, this approach would seem to provide the most
positive impact on the cost-benefit analysis. Creating a separate bar and
bar exam will introduce additional administrative costs for the PTO, and
ultimately, these costs will get passed on to applicants in terms of higher
fees. The members of the patent bar may oppose the exclusion of
scientists and engineers from the design bar, because they will lose the
attorneys' fees that come from the steadily increasing number of design
patent prosecutions. But this hardly seems like a legitimate reason for
objecting. None of these costs seem excessive from the perspective of
desiring high quality design patents.
Perhaps a larger worry is that having a design patent bar that is
limited to those with design degrees will further constrain competition
among prosecutors if there aren't many people who satisfy the criteria.
If there aren't that many designers who go to law school, the number of
design patent prosecutors could shrink, and the price of obtaining and
challenging design patents would rise. As a stopgap measure, the PTO
might consider grandfathering in all current members of the patent bar
into both the utility and design patent bars.
Currently, the patent bar exam only includes two or three questions about design patents out
of the one hundred total questions. See Memorandum on the Study of Diversity Among Patent
Applicants by the U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 173.
200
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2. Eliminate All Eligibility Rules for Design Patent Prosecution
Ultimately, we are not persuaded that limiting prosecution of
design patents to those with particular educational credentials is
worthwhile. Design patents may be among the clearest legal documents
to read and draft. Although artistic skill is clearly required to produce
the drawings in a design patent, 20 1 the design patent's text is simple. As
we explained above, each design patent only includes a single claim, in
the form of "the ornamental design of [X]." And while various legal
strategies are important components of advising designers, we believe
this knowledge to be generally learnable by all trained attorneys
regardless of educational background. Finally, we suspect that the
market for design patent attorneys' services can handle expertise issues
without external intervention. The law firms that hire attorneys and the
clients who hire the law firms are generally sophisticated parties
20 2 Design
capable of determining what level of expertise is appropriate.
patent prosecution, no less than trademark prosecution, is unlikely to
suffer from a costly market failure that is worthy of legal intervention.
To the extent, then, that the educational eligibility rules are not
cost-justified for design patents, the PTO could simply scrap them with
respect to design patent prosecution, expanding eligibility to join the
new design patent bar to any attorney in good standing with a state
bar. 20 3 We suspect that the PTO might want to offer a patent bar exam
that is specific to design patents, although we do not believe this to be
essential. Accordingly, anyone who could master the rules of design
patent prosecution would be allowed to offer their services to design
inventors.
Doing away with the education requirements would place design
patent prosecutors between the PTO's treatment of utility patent
prosecutors and its treatment of trademark prosecutors. Trademark
prosecutors are not subject to the same requirements as patent
prosecutors. Indeed, the PTO does not require trademark prosecutors to
be registered with the office, 20 4 nor does it require trademark
5
prosecutors to sit for and pass a separate bar exam, 20 even though
201 Applicants have the option of using professional drawing services to offer the best rendering

of their design, just as is the case for the drawings of utility patents.
202 While it is true that independent designers may not be very sophisticated about the appropriate
qualifications for design patent attorneys, they are likely to be able to consider some of the
relevant issues. There is no reason to think that they are less sophisticated than those who hire
attorneys to assist with their taxes despite the lack of educational requirements for tax attorneys.
203 We are assuming, here, that sitting for the patent bar exam is, itself, a legitimate hurdle to
place on patent prosecutors. For concerns about the patent bar exam, see Guerrini, supra note 2 1,
at 328.
204 37 C.F.R. § 11.14 (2009).
205 Id.
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trademark prosecution, like patent prosecution, is governed by a robust
set of PTO rules. 206 The PTO does not require that trademark
prosecutors possess a specific educational background,2 07 despite the
possibility that certain backgrounds such as art, design, marketing, and
advertising could be useful in the context of trademark prosecution. In
our proposed design patent bar, prosecutors would not be subject to any
educational restrictions (as in trademark law), but they would still be
subject to a design patent bar exam that tests rules and procedures (as in
utility patent law).
This proposal's principle merit compared to the prior suggestion is
that it would dramatically expand the pool of eligible design patent
prosecutors and significantly reduce the costs of obtaining and
challenging patents. We wouldn't have to worry about a shortage of
design-trained attorneys, because all attorneys would be eligible for the
design patent bar. 208 Further, to the extent that familiarity with the
PTO's prosecution procedures is valuable, the design patent bar exam
could help ensure that practitioners know them.
As with other sorts of occupational licensing, the question here is
whether the benefits of eradicating the PTO's eligibility requirements
for design patent prosecution would exceed its costs. The goal is to find
the cheapest means of maintaining patent quality. We believe that this
approach is likely to offer the best option, largely because it maximizes
the size of the pool of design patent prosecutors without seriously
risking design or utility patent quality. The patent bar can remain to
make sure that practitioners understand the rules, and applicants will be
able to engage in appropriate sorting to hire the prosecutors that they
desire. As a practical matter, there should be no concern about a
negative impact on patent quality if the PTO's eligibility requirements
were eliminated, because, as we explained above, law firms and their
clients are generally well-positioned to screen for the credentials they
deem appropriate.
CONCLUSION

Each of the solutions that we propose necessarily entails some
administrative cost for the PTO, but we are confident that these costs
are dwarfed by the substantial benefits that will arise from increased
fairness, efficiency, and equal access to the legal profession. The PTO

206 U.S. Trademark Law, Rules of Practice & Federal Statutes, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.

(Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tmlaw.pdf.
207 37 C.F.R. § 11.14.
208 The situation with respect to design patent agents is somewhat less clear. To the extent that
non-attorneys will be allowed to prosecute design patents in the way that they are allowed to
prosecute utility patents as patent agents, we could imagine opening these positions up to anyone
with a bachelor's degree who could pass the new design patent bar exam.
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should not let status quo bias or the personal economic interests of one
class of attorneys prevent it from amending its educational eligibility
policies.

